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An economy with unrealistic indicators: an evaluation 
of the economic situation in Belarus and a forecast for 2013
Kamil Kłysiński
The macroeconomic results achieved by Belarus in 2012 laid bare the weakness and the ineffi-
ciency of its economy. Belarus’s GDP and positive trade balance were growing in the first half 
of last year. However, this trend was reversed when Russia blocked the scheme of extremely 
lucrative manipulations in the re-export of Russian petroleum products by Belarus and when 
the demand for potassium fertilisers fell on the global market. It became clear once again that 
the outdated Belarusian model of a centrally planned economy is unable to generate susta-
inable growth, and the Belarusian economy needs thorough structural reforms. Nevertheless, 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka consistently continues to block any changes in the system 
and at the same time expects that the economic indicators this year will reach levels far bey-
ond the possibilities of the Belarusian economy. Therefore, there is a risk that the Belarusian 
government may employ – as they used to do – instruments aimed at artificially stimulating 
domestic demand, including money creation. This may upset the relative stability of state 
finances, which the regime managed to achieve last year. The worst case scenario would see 
a repeat of what happened in 2011, when a serious financial crisis occurred, forcing Minsk to 
make concessions (including selling the national network of gas pipelines) to Moscow, its only 
real source of loans. It thus cannot be ruled out that also this time the only way to recover 
from the slump will be to receive additional loan support and energy subsidies from Russia at 
the expense of selling further strategic companies to Russian investors.
The poor financial results in 2012
According to the official statistics of Belarus, its 
GDP last year grew by 1.5%; this being one of 
the poorest results over more than ten years 
now1. The Belarusian government was unable 
to achieve the rate of 5% to 5.5% it had planned 
for 2012. It is worth noting that there was 
a characteristic gradual slowdown in GDP 
growth throughout last year. In the first five 
months, it reached approximately 3%, after the 
ninth month it fell to 2.5%, and at the end of 
1 It was only in 2009 (when the global crisis reached its 
peak) that the result was worse (0.2%).
the eleventh month it was as low as 2% (see 
Appendix). 
A similar trend was observed in foreign trade 
in goods. During the first seven months of 
2012, the positive balance was constantly 
growing, owing to which the level of US$2 bil-
lion was exceeded at the end of July. This was 
a great achievement against the same period 
a year before, when the balance was a loss of 
US$3.4 billion. However, starting with August, 
this trend reversed. As a result, the positive bal-
ance melted to approximately US$200 million 
by the end of November. At the end of the year, 
the trade balance was negative and reached mi-
nus US$412 million. 
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These two indicators fell mainly due to the fact that 
Russia blocked the re-export of Russian petroleum 
products (kerosene) at the end of July last year. 
These were being sold by Belarusian companies as 
thinners and solvents to EU markets. The Belaru-
sian side was thus evading its obligation to pay its 
profits from export duty imposed on petroleum 
products to the Russian budget. According to ini-
tial estimates, Belarus earned at least US$2 billion 
and was thus able to increase its GDP by 2.5% to 
3% owing to this trick. Furthermore, Belarus’s eco-
nomic results were adversely affected by the 20% 
decrease in exports of potassium fertilisers, which 
– along with petroleum products, food and the 
products of the machine-building sector – are one 
of the pillars of Belarus’s exports2. This was an ef-
fect of lower demand from the key importers, i.e. 
China and India, which have compiled significant 
stocks of fertilisers and are expecting to be offered 
lower prices for future supplies. 
Last year, the Belarusian government also failed 
to fulfil its plan of lifting the level of foreign di-
rect investments. Out of the planned US$3.7 bil-
lion, only US$1.2 billion was received (data for the 
first eleven months of 2012), and this was mostly 
income generated by foreign capital which had 
already been present in Belarus. This income was 
spent on further developing the investments. 
What was fulfilled was the plan to set the rate 
of inflation. At the end of the year it stood at 
21.8%, with the expected level ranging be-
tween 19% and 22%3. The government also 
managed to fulfil its promise to raise wages – 
on 1 January 2013 the average wage in Belarus 
2 The potassium sector earns between 20% and 35% of 
foreign currency income in the Belarusian state budget. 
In 2011, the profit from exports of potassium fertilisers 
reached US$3.2 billion. In 2012, exports fell 20% and 
earned only US$2.4 billion. 
3 For comparison, in 2011, as a consequence of the finan-
cial crisis in Belarus and two consecutive devaluations of 
the Belarusian currency, the inflation rate escalated to 
108.7%, the highest in Europe. It was possible to keep 
the inflation rate at a relatively low level in 2012 owing 
to the stabilisation of the Belarusian currency’s exchange 
rate and postponing part of the price rises until the be-
ginning of this year. At the same time, the money issue 
level grew alarmingly high last year – the weight of mon-
ey rate grew over 57%, against the planned rate of 25%. 
was US$533. Furthermore, the government 
has been successful in maintaining a high level 
(for Belarus) of foreign currency reserves – on 
1 February 2013 they slightly exceeded US$8 bil-
lion. Belarus’s foreign public debt is growing at 
a slower rate than in the preceding years. 
According to official data, its debt last year 
increased by US$209 million, reaching a total 
of US$12 billion4. Even though 2013 marks the 
beginning of the debt repayment peak, and 
Belarus will have to pay back approximately 
US$3 billion, this will not pose any major threat 
to public finances owing to its significant for-
eign currency reserves. However, it may turn 
out that, seeing no other way out, the Belaru-
sian government will be forced to severely de-
plete these reserves and this will adversely af-
fect, for example, its capabilities to intervene on 
the foreign currency market in the longer term. 
This scenario appears realistic, given the fact 
that the government’s attempts to sell bonds 
on EU and Asian markets, worth in aggregate 
US$500-600 million, have failed to bring the 
expected result. 
The ambitious plans for 2013
Regardless of the poor results in 2012, the 
Belarusian government is planning that the 
4 On 7 December 2012, the Anti-Crisis Fund of the Eur-
asian Economic Community, which is controlled by 
Russia, made US$440 million available to Belarus as the 
fourth instalment of the stabilisation loan, worth US$3 
billion in total, which was granted in 2011.
 The Belarusian side had not received these funds by the 
end of 2012, though. The official reason stated for this 
delay were the fund’s technical problems. The money 
was finally received on 31 January 2013.
Last year, the Belarusian government 
failed to fulfil its plan of lifting the level 
of foreign direct investments. Out of the 
planned US$3.7 billion, only US$1.2 billion 
was received.
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country’s GDP will grow by 8.5% in 2013. This 
rate is far above even the most optimistic es-
timates presented by independent Belarusian 
experts, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. According to them, it could 
grow approximately 4% at the most. The plans 
concerning foreign direct investments are 
equally ambitious — these are expected to 
reach US$4.5 billion this year. In turn, the in-
flation rate is planned to reach as low a level as 
12%. Such indicators have been chosen due to 
personal pressure from Alyaksandr Lukashenka, 
for whom economic policy still means primari-
ly issuing orders, controlling the distribution of 
benefits and central planning. Furthermore, the 
Belarusian president has made economic issues 
subordinate to the implementation of his over-
riding political goal, namely to maintain and re-
inforce his authoritarian regime. This is the rea-
son why he is putting such great emphasis on 
GDP growth, which in turn brings about a high 
level of industrial production, and thus a sta-
ble social situation at large companies. This is 
also the reason why he insists on a continuous 
increase of wages, regardless of labour produc-
tivity, which is the key indicator in this case5. 
At the same time, Lukashenka is aware of the 
need to improve the efficiency of the national 
economy, and ordered an extensive technolog-
ical modernisation of hundreds of Belarusian 
companies already last year. 
5 According to Belarusian statistics, between January and 
November 2012, the wage growth ratio was as much as 
five times higher than the productivity growth ratio. 
The inadequate macroeconomic policy 
of the Belarusian government
The Belarusian government quotes three fac-
tors which reportedly prove the feasibility of 
the economic plan for this year: the expected 
favourable situation on foreign markets, the 
planned influx of significant foreign direct in-
vestments, and the improved performance of 
the modernised companies. However, these 
assumptions are rather unrealistic. Nothing 
seems to indicate that Belarus will be able to 
repeat its success with selling Russian petro-
leum products in 2013. Moscow has clearly 
adopted a tougher stance and expects Minsk 
to invariably perform its obligation to both the 
duty imposed on products exported by Belar-
usian refineries and to supply part (2 million 
tonnes) of the petroleum products manufac-
tured by Belarusian refineries to the Russian 
market. Furthermore, Russia is currently offer-
ing less favourable oil supply conditions6. This 
is apparently aimed at convincing Minsk to sell 
its oil refineries in Mazyr and Navapolatsk. Due 
to Belarusian resistance, it has been impossible 
to establish the supply balance for the entire 
2013 as yet, and the parties have only made 
temporary arrangements for the first quarter of 
2013. Given these circumstances, it is difficult 
to expect any significant increase in the income 
of the Belarusian oil industry, which accounts 
for 35% of Belarusian exports and generates 
approximately 30% of the budget income7. 
An improvement of the situation on the glob-
al market of potassium fertilisers is also rather 
unlikely, and thus foreign currency income in 
the Belarusian budget will be seriously reduced. 
One proof for this is the short-term contracts 
6 First of all, Russia offered to reduce the annual level of 
supplies using the Druzhba oil pipeline –which is the 
cheapest supply route – to 18.5 million tonnes, while 
the amount expected by Belarus was 23 million tonnes. 
Belarusian recipients would have to import the rest of oil 
using much more expensive railway transport. 
7 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-
tary/2012-06-19/inexhaustible-source-income-signifi-
cance-belarusian-refineries
For Alyaksandr Lukashenka, econom-
ic policy means primarily issuing orders, 
controlling the distribution of benefits and 
central planning; its overriding goal is to 
maintain and reinforce his authoritarian 
regime.
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which were signed at the beginning of this year 
with the two major recipients of this product: 
China and India. Everything seems to indicate 
that the petrochemical sector, which is pivotal 
for the Belarusian economy, will be unable to 
generate significant economic growth. 
The expectations that the influx of foreign di-
rect investments will increase are even less re-
alistic. The investment climate is still unfavour-
able, due to the inconsistent and discretionary 
policy adopted by the government towards 
foreign investors and domestic capital alike. 
Such moves as the renationalisation of the food 
factories Kommunarka and Spartak in October 
last year8 or the ban on quitting jobs imposed 
on people working in the wood sector in De-
cember last year have effectively discouraged 
and will discourage prospective investors from 
bringing their capital to Belarus9. Furthermore, 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, fearing any weakening 
of his authoritarian regime, has been consis-
tently blocking privatisation and clearly em-
phasising that he will only agree to sell select-
ed entities to purchasers who will be ready to 
accept his conditions (for example, concerning 
maintaining the staffing levels, financing social 
projects, etc.). 
However, what appears to be the most dubi-
ous assumption is that the modernisation of 
hundreds of industrial plants planned for this 
year will bring a rapid improvement in the per-
formance of industry, which will be felt already 
8 On 12 October, Alyaksandr Lukashenka criticised Marat 
Novikov, a private entrepreneur who then held con-
trolling stakes in Spartak and Kommunarka, and ordered 
that the supervisory boards of these two companies be 
disbanded. The directors were fired and state control 
of the two entities was reintroduced. Then, the general 
assembly of shareholders of the two Belarusian confec-
tionery factories, Kommunarka and Spartak, decided to 
carry out an additional issue of shares in order to in-
crease the stake held by the Treasury from 22% to 57% 
and from 13% to 60%, respectively. Through this, the 
state took over control of these private companies, thus 
violating Belarusian law and the principle of respect for 
private property. 
9 h t t p : / / w w w . o s w . w a w . p l / p l / p u b l i k a c j e / t y -
dzien -na -wschodzie / 2012-12-12 /w ladze -b ia lo -
ruskie-wprowadzaja-przymus-pracy 
this year. The modernisation projects currently 
in operation, for example in the wood industry, 
have proven that the government is not ready 
for the restructuring of plants, changes in the 
management organisation or staffing levels, etc. 
The modernisation actions are restricted to the 
gradual (oftentimes very delayed and poorly 
organised) replacement of machinery, which 
makes the efficiency of these projects doubtful. 
Besides, it is impossible to finance these expen-
sive investments, the estimated cost of which 
will reach billions of dollars (the modernisation 
of the plants controlled by the Ministry of Indus-
try alone will swallow up over US$3 billion)10. 
Reform blocking
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, while imposing such 
ambitious and at the same time unrealistic eco-
nomic goals, is simultaneously blocking any 
moves from those few supporters of economic 
reforms in the Belarusian government. Siarhei 
Rumas, who was in charge of economic affairs in 
the government, resigned from his post as dep-
uty prime minister on 31 July 2012. According 
to unofficial information, he decided to resign 
due to the impossibility of making any rational 
changes in the Belarusian economic system. 
This was a clear sign that the president, fearing 
that his power and grip on the economy could 
weaken, would back supporters of conservative 
solutions. One proof of this was the nomination 
of Piotr Prokopovich as deputy prime minister 
on 18 January 2013. Prokopovich was the head 
10 http://naviny.by/rubrics/economic/2013/01/14/ic_artic-
les_113_180505/.
Everything seems to indicate that the pet-
rochemical sector, which is pivotal for the 
Belarusian economy, will be unable to gen-
erate economic growth as high as in 2012.
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of the Belarusian central bank for many years. 
Although his evaluation of the condition of the 
Belarusian economy is realistic, he is still a sup-
porter of manual control and interventionism 
in the economy. The duties of the new deputy 
prime minister will include primarily ensuring 
that the adopted macroeconomic indicators are 
achieved, that the budget is met and the mod-
ernisation plans are implemented. Most inde-
pendent Belarusian economists agree that the 
new deputy prime minister will attempt to fulfil 
his tasks first of all by means of artificially stim-
ulating domestic demand – through increasing 
wages, money creation, and granting loans for 
state-controlled investment programmes, in-
cluding cheap housing development11. 
Conclusion
The poor economic results achieved in 2012 
have shown how strongly the Belarusian econo-
my relies on the good condition on the markets 
of a small group of products, including primari-
ly petroleum products and potassium fertilisers. 
Furthermore, as proven last year, the tricks used 
in the re-export of petroleum products, which 
were stopped in the second half of 2012, had 
significantly contributed to improving the fi-
nancial situation of Belarus. For obvious rea-
sons, operations of this kind may only provide 
11 Piotr Prokopovich has a degree in construction engi-
neering and has long work experience in the construc-
tion industry. He is actively lobbying for the interests of 
the construction sector within President Lukashenka’s 
inner circle. This year he is very likely to make efforts 
to receive financial backing for the construction of 
6.5 million m2 of apartments planned for this year. 
profits in the short run. This means that Belarus 
has no strong economic system that would be 
able to ensure stable income to the budget and 
the necessary economic growth. Besides this, 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka has been consistently 
blocking reforms. As a consequence, it will be 
impossible to reach such ambitious macroeco-
nomic indicators without artificially stimulating 
demand on the domestic market. Such mea-
sures taken by the Belarusian government may 
– as in 2011 – lead to rampaging inflation and 
a deep crisis in state finances. Belarus managed 
to escape a complete economic collapse two 
years ago owing to support from Russia which, 
since the breakdown of the dialogue with the 
West in December 2010, has become Belarus’s 
sole lender. At that time, in exchange for loans 
and energy subsidies, Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
granted consent for Gazprom to take over to-
tal control of the Belarusian gas pipelines and 
backed the Russian plans for a reintegration of 
the post-Soviet area, including the establish-
ment of the Eurasian Union. It seems quite likely 
that this scenario will be repeated, in which case 
Minsk will have to make further concessions to 
the Kremlin, primarily those regarding the pri-
vatisation of the strategic companies in the pet-
rochemical, machine-building and food indus-
tries. Belarus is thus under no risk of economic 
collapse in the immediate future, as this would 
be too serious a political and financial prob-
lem for Russia, especially in the context of the 
implementation of the Eurasian Union project. 
However, the price Minsk will have to pay for its 
unrealistic economic policy will be a further in-
crease in its already high dependence on Russia.
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1. Belarus’s GDP growth in 2012
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus (www.belstat.gov.by)
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus (www.belstat.gov.by)
2. Belarus’s foreign trade balance in 2012 
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